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ABSTRACT
We investigate the consequences of demographic change for business cycle analysis. We ﬁnd that
changes in the age composition of the labor force account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the variation in
business cycle volatility observed in the U.S. and other G7 economies. During the postwar period,
these countries experienced dramatic demographic change, although details regarding extent and
timing diﬀer from place to place. Using panel-data methods, we exploit this variation to show
that the age composition of the workforce has a large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on cyclical
volatility. We conclude by relating these ﬁndings to the recent decline in U.S. business cycle volatility.
Using both simple accounting exercises and a quantitative general equilibrium model, we ﬁnd that
demographic change accounts for a signiﬁcant part of this moderation.
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Reserve System.1. Introduction
The baby boom and subsequent baby bust in the U.S. resulted in dramatic shifts
in the age composition of the American population. Japan, Germany, and other
industrialized countries have experienced similarly dramatic demographic change
during the postwar period, although the details regarding timing and magnitude
diﬀer from place to place. In this paper, we investigate the consequences of de-
mographic change for business cycle analysis.
Recently, a great deal of attention has been devoted to studying the moder-
ation in business cycle volatility in the U.S since the mid-1980s. However, less
attention has been paid to the run-up in volatility that began in the mid-1960s.
We propose demographic change as a framework that can rationalize the evolution
of U.S. macroeconomic volatility over the last four decades. Moreover, we oﬀer
this framework as relevant for understanding the evolution of cyclical volatility
observed in other industrialized economies during the postwar period. Speciﬁ-
cally, we ﬁnd that changes in the age composition of the workforce account for
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction of the variation in business cycle volatility observed in the
U.S. and the rest of the G7.
We establish the relationship between demographics and macroeconomic volatil-
ity in the following manner. First, we document important diﬀerences in the
responsiveness of labor market activity to the business cycle for individuals of dif-
ferent ages. In previous work Clark and Summers (1981), Ríos-Rull (1996), and
Gomme et al. (2004) showed, using postwar U.S. data, that the cyclical volatility
of market work is U-shaped as a function of age. The young experience much more
volatility of employment and hours worked than the prime-aged over the business
cycle; those closer to retirement experience volatility somewhere in between. Our
ﬁrst contribution is to show that this is an empirical regularity for all G7 countries.Speciﬁcally, we show in Section 2 that the volatility of market work is U-shaped
as a function of age in these economies. For example, when averaged across coun-
tries, the standard deviation of cyclical employment ﬂuctuations for 15 - 19 year
olds is nearly six times greater than that of 40 - 49 year olds; as a result, although
teenagers comprise only 6% of aggregate employment, they account for 17% of
aggregate employment volatility. Similarly, the average employment volatility of
60 - 64 year olds is about three times greater than that of 40 - 49 year olds.
Given this observation, a natural conjecture is that the responsiveness of ag-
gregate output to business cycle shocks will depend on the age composition of the
workforce. For instance, suppose that the volatility of age-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n t
is unaﬀected by age composition. Then, when an economy is characterized by
a large share of young workers, all else equal, these should be periods of greater
cyclical volatility in market work and output than would otherwise occur. Our
second contribution is to show that this is indeed the case.
During the postwar period, the G7 countries experienced substantial variation
in business cycle volatility. Variation in the nature of demographic change across
countries allows us to identify the eﬀect of workforce age composition. In Section 3,
we use panel-data methods to show that the age composition has a quantitatively
large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on measures of business cycle volatility.
Because workforce composition is largely determined by fertility decisions made
at least 15 years prior to current volatility, this allows us to obtain unbiased
inference on the causal eﬀect with standard econometric techniques.
In Section 4, we relate these ﬁndings to the recent literature on “The Great
Moderation” — the decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced in the U.S.
since the mid-1980s.1 Through simple quantitative accounting exercises, we ﬁnd
1See Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) for early papers iden-
tifying a change in output growth volatility. Blanchard and Simon (2001) argue that this mod-
eration is part of a longer term phenomenon starting at least since the 1950s. The term “The
2that demographic change accounts for roughly one ﬁfth to one third of the mod-
eration experienced in the U.S. Clearly, demographic change is not the sole factor
responsible for this episode; nevertheless, demographic change constitutes a com-
mon factor relevant for understanding the evolution of business cycle volatility —
not only in the U.S., but also in other G7 countries — over the past four decades.2
The results of our accounting exercises indicate that demographic composition
plays an important role in the propagation of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Our
ﬁnal contribution is to articulate this notion within a quantitative macroeconomic
framework. In Section 5, we describe a simple variant of the standard real business
cycle model that emphasizes the role of age as determining an individual’s labor
market experience. We show that the model is capable of accounting for diﬀerences
in the volatility of hours worked across age groups, and demonstrate how variation
in age composition manifests itself in variation of macroeconomic volatility. We
provide concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Diﬀe r e n c e si nM a r k e tW o r kV o l a t i l i t yb yA g e
In this section, we analyze the responsiveness of market work to the business cycle
for data disaggregated by age. We begin with an analysis of the U.S. and Japan,
countries for which consistent information on hours worked by age is available.
We supplement this with an “episodic” analysis, by documenting the response of
the unemployment rate to postwar U.S. recessions for various age groups. We
conclude the section with an analysis of how the volatility of employment diﬀers
by age in the sample of industrialized economies represented by the G7.
Great Moderation” is ﬁrst used to describe this phenomenon by Stock and Watson (2002), and
more recently by Bernanke (2004).
2See also Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003) for analysis of changes
in macroeconomic volatility in the G7.
32.1. Evidence on Hours Worked from the U.S. and Japan
Our approach to studying diﬀerences in business cycle volatility by age is similar
to that of Gomme et al. (2004). We use data from the March supplement of the
CPS to construct annual series of per capita hours worked from 1963 to 2005 for
15-to-19 year olds, 20-to-24 year olds, 25-to-29 year olds, and so on, proceeding
in 5-year age groups to 60-to-64 year olds, and ﬁnally those aged 65 years and
up. We also construct an aggregate series for all individuals 15 years and up. For
Japan, we construct age-speciﬁc, annual time series covering 1972 to 2004, using
data from the Annual Report of the Labour Force Survey. See Appendix A for
detailed information on data sources used throughout the paper.
To extract the high frequency component of hours worked, we remove the trend
from each series using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. Since we are interested in
ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies (those higher than eight years), we use
a smoothing parameter of 10 for annual data.3,4
Table 2.1 presents results for the volatility of hours worked in the U.S. for
various age groups. The ﬁrst row presents the percent standard deviation of the
detrended age-speciﬁc series. We see a distinct U-shaped pattern in the volatility
of hours worked by age.
We are not interested in the high frequency ﬂuctuations in these time series
per se, but rather in those that are correlated with the business cycle. For each
age-speciﬁc hours worked series, we identify the business cycle component as the
projection on a constant, current detrended output, and on current and lagged de-
trended aggregate hours. Our measure of cyclical volatility is the percent standard
3Baxter and King (1999) show that this choice yields a very close approximation to the ideal
high-pass ﬁlter for annual data. Throughout this paper, we have repeated our analysis of annual
data using the band-pass ﬁlter proposed by Baxter and King, removing ﬂuctuations less frequent
than eight years. The results are essentially identical in all cases.
4Since much of the literature uses a parameter value of 100, we repeat the analysis of this
subsection for this choice in Appendix B; the results are very similar and are not discussed here.
415-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65+
raw
volatility 4.845 2.384 1.691 1.202 0.898 0.909 1.406 3.083
R2 0.79 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.72 0.33 0.25
cyclical
volatility 4.346 2.139 1.518 1.138 0.829 0.780 0.800 1.570
%o fh o u r s 3.24 10.33 12.86 25.38 23.29 17.20 4.82 2.88
%o fh o u r s
volatility 11.14 17.49 15.44 22.86 15.84 10.61 3.04 3.58
Table 2.1: Volatility of Hours Worked by Age Group, US. HP ﬁltered data.
deviation of these projections.
The second row of Table 2.1 reports the R2 f r o mt h er e g r e s s i o no fd e t r e n d e d
age-speciﬁc hours worked on aggregate output and hours. This is very high for
most age groups, indicating that the preponderance of high frequency ﬂuctuations
are attributable to the business cycle. The exceptions are the 60 - 64 and the 65+
age groups. Here, a larger fraction of ﬂuctuations are potentially due to age-
speciﬁc, non-cyclical shocks.5 The third row indicates the business cycle volatility
of hours worked for each age group.
Compared to Row 1, the largest diﬀerences between “raw” and “cyclical”
volatilities are for those aged 60 years and up, reﬂecting the discussion of the
previous paragraph. Nevertheless, the U-shaped pattern remains. The young ex-
perience much greater cyclical volatility in hours than the prime-aged; the volatil-
ity of those close to or at retirement age is somewhere in between. Moreover,
the diﬀerences in cyclical volatilities across age groups are large. The standard
deviation of cyclical hours ﬂuctuations for 15 - 19 and 20 - 24 year old workers is
more than 5.5 and 2.5 times that of 50 - 59 year olds, respectively. Relative to
the 50 - 59 year olds, hours worked is roughly twice as volatile for the 25 - 29 and
5Alternatively, the small fraction of individuals participating in the labor market may give
rise to measurement error.
565+ age groups.6
The fourth row indicates the average share of aggregate hours worked dur-
ing the sample period by each age group. The last row indicates the share of
“aggregate hours volatility” attributable to each age group. Here, aggregate
hours volatility is represented by the hours-weighted average of age-speciﬁc cycli-
cal volatilities. What is striking is the extent to which ﬂuctuations in aggregate
hours are disproportionately accounted for by young workers. Although those
aged 15 - 29 make up only 26% of aggregate hours worked, they account for 44%
of aggregate hours volatility. By contrast, prime-aged workers in their 40s and
50s account for 41% of hours but only 26% of hours volatility.
These large diﬀerences by age remain when we undertake further demographic
breakdowns. These results are presented in Appendix B and summarized here.
We ﬁrst disaggregate the U.S. workforce by age and educational attainment. For
brevity, we present results only for two education groups: those with high school
diplomas and less (less education), and those with at least some postsecondary
education (more education). Several observations deserve mention.
First, there is a noticeable diﬀerence in the volatility of hours by education.
Interestingly, the diﬀerences across education are much less pronounced for young
workers than for the prime-aged. A simple average across 20 - 24 and 25 - 29
year olds indicates that those with less education have hours volatility that is 1.5
times that of those with more; by contrast, the diﬀerence across education groups
is a factor of 3 for those aged 30 - 59. Finally, note that the U-shaped pattern
remains for both education groups, with large diﬀerences by age. For instance, 20
6These results corroborate the ﬁndings of Gomme et al. (2004), and extend them to include
data from the most recent recession. See also Clark and Summers (1981), Moser (1986), Rios-
Rull (1996), and Nagypál (2004) who document diﬀerences in cyclical sensitivity across age
groups. More broadly, the literature documents diﬀerences as a function of skill; see for instance,
Kydland and Prescott (1993) and Hoynes (2000), and the references therein. Note that those
studies are conﬁned to the analysis of U.S. data.
615-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65+
raw
volatility 2.868 0.965 0.835 0.759 0.626 0.640 1.021 1.203
R2 0.65 0.64 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.42 0.53
cyclical
volatility 2.338 0.769 0.775 0.710 0.593 0.619 0.662 0.846
%o fh o u r s 2.21 10.18 11.77 23.34 24.19 18.67 4.92 4.73
%o fh o u r s
volatility 7.17 10.88 12.67 23.02 19.93 16.06 4.52 5.75
Table 2.2: Volatility of Hours Worked by Age Group, Japan. HP ﬁltered data.
- 24 year olds experience hours volatility roughly 3 times greater than 40 - 49 year
olds, regardless of educational attainment. Indeed, 20 - 29 year olds with more
education have greater volatility than prime-age workers with less education.
Appendix B also presents results disaggregated by age and gender. Again, the
U-shaped pattern exists for both men and women. Moreover, the magnitude of
volatility diﬀerences by age is roughly similar. Importantly, the diﬀerences across
age groups within gender are much more pronounced than the diﬀerences across
genders within age groups. An average across age groups indicates that males have
10% higher hours volatility over the cycle. On the other hand, 15 - 19 and 20 -
24 year olds experience hours ﬂuctuations that are roughly 5.5 and 3 times more
volatile than 50 - 59 year olds, for either gender. Gomme et al. (2004) discuss age
diﬀerences with further demographic breakdowns (e.g., marital status, industry of
occupation) for the U.S. Their results corroborate those presented here, indicating
large and important diﬀerences in the volatility of hours worked by age.
Table 2.2 presents the same calculations as shown in Table 2.1 for Japan. As
in the U.S., there is a distinct U-shaped pattern to both the raw and the cyclical
volatility of hours worked as a function of age. Several diﬀerences between the
two countries deserve mention.
7First, the volatility of hours worked is smaller in Japan overall. Second, the
age-speciﬁcr e g r e s s i o nR2s for those aged 60+ are larger in Japan than in the U.S.,
indicating that hours ﬂuctuations for these workers are more correlated with the
business cycle. Third, the volatility of teenagers and those aged 65+ relative to
the prime-aged is roughly similar to that found in the U.S. For the remaining
age groups, the diﬀerences are not as pronounced, although signiﬁcant volatility
diﬀerences by age remain.
Finally, individuals over the age of 60 in Japan are much more signiﬁcant
contributors to the volatility of aggregate hours than those in the U.S. This is
due to their larger hours share and their greater age-speciﬁc cyclical volatility. In
fact, except for teenagers, the 65+ group experiences greater cyclical volatility in
hours worked than any other age group.
2.2. Evidence on Unemployment from the U.S.
In this subsection, we provide additional evidence of the diﬀerences in business
cycle sensitivity across age groups. In Figure 1, we present the average response
of unemployment to a postwar U.S. recession. The unemployment rate data come
from the BLS, cover the period 1948:I - 2004:II, and are available for the age groups
presented. As in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006), we deﬁne a recession as a period in
which ﬁltered real output falls below trend for at least two consecutive quarters.
F o rt h i se x e r c i s ew eu s et h eB Pﬁlter proposed by Baxter and King (1999) to
isolate periodic ﬂuctuations between 6 and 32 quarters.7,8 Along the horizontal
7Relative to the high-pass ﬁlter, removing the high frequency ﬂuctuations allows us to plot
smoother unemployment rate responses. Otherwise, there are no substantive diﬀerences between
the two ﬁltering methods.
8This method identiﬁes all of the NBER Dating Committee recessions, plus four additional
episodes: 1962:II, 1967:II, 1986:III, and 1994:III. The timing of our recessions and those identiﬁed
by the NBER is very similar. For the 10 recessions identiﬁed by the NBER, our procedure
produces six whose starting date coincides with the peak quarter chosen by the NBER: 1948:IV,
1957:III, 1960:II, 1980:I, 1981:III, and 1990:III. For the other four, the starting dates are within
8axis, date 0 represents the last quarter before output falls below trend. The ﬁgure
tracks the BP-ﬁltered age-speciﬁc unemployment rates for 20 quarters beyond this
date. The solid line represents the recessionary response averaged across episodes,
while the dashed lines represent 2-standard deviation bands. Unemployment rises
quickly in response to a recession, and crosses above trend at date 2 (for all age
groups except the 65+, which crosses at date 3). The response peaks at date 4 or
5, then slowly returns to trend.
This recessionary response is much stronger for young individuals. While the
unemployment rate of 16 - 19 and 20 - 24 year olds increases by 1% above trend,
the increase is only about 0.5% for prime-aged workers. Moreover, the 16 - 19 and
20 - 24 year olds experience average trough-to-peak responses of approximately
2.4% around trend. This compares with a trough-to-peak response of only 1%
for prime-aged individuals. In summary, the unemployment rate response to a
recession for young workers is roughly 2 to 2.5 times greater than that of prime-
aged individuals.
2.3. Evidence on Employment from the G7
We provide further evidence on the diﬀerences across age groups in business cycle
volatility by considering data for the G7 economies. Because hours worked data
disaggregated by age are not available for all countries, we restrict our attention to
employment. The data we analyze are from published and unpublished national
government sources, and the OECD Labour Force Statistics database. The data
are at an annual frequency, and the time coverage varies across countries. Again,
see Appendix A for details.
We identify cyclical ﬂuctuations in the data as we did in our analysis of hours
one quarter of the NBER dates (indicated in parentheses): 1953:III (II), 1969:III (IV), 1974:II
(III), and 2001:II (I).
9worked. For many of the G7 countries, the high frequency ﬂuctuations of those
aged 65 and older are largely orthogonal to the business cycle. For instance, from
the regression of employment of the 65+ age group on aggregate employment and
output, the R2 for France is only 0.02. In Italy, employment for this group is
actually negatively correlated with the cycle. As a result, for all countries except
Japan, we omit those aged 65 years and up, and deﬁne aggregate employment
as that among 15-to-64 year olds.9 We retain this older group for Japan since
their age-speciﬁc employment regression produces an R2 of 0.7; this indicates
that employment among the old is highly correlated with the cycle.
In Table 2.3 we present our results for HP-ﬁltered data from the G7. For
brevity, the information displayed is condensed relative to Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Because postwar aggregate employment volatility varies widely across countries,
we normalize the age-speciﬁc measures by expressing them relative to the volatility
of 40 - 49 year olds.
Again, the age proﬁle of business cycle employment volatility can be char-
acterized as roughly U-shaped, with large diﬀerences across age groups.10 The
young and old display greater cyclical sensitivity than prime-aged individuals. In
all countries, the 15 - 29 year olds are substantially more volatile than those aged
30 - 59. This is particularly true for the continental European countries. Taking
a simple average across all G7 countries, we ﬁnd that while the young comprise
30% of aggregate employment, they account for approximately 50% of aggregate
employment volatility. Large diﬀerences between the prime-aged and those over
60 are also evident in Europe and Japan. In each of these countries, this older
group also contributes disproportionately to aggregate volatility.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that age-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in business cycle respon-
9Since the 65+ share of the labor force and employment is small, our results are unchanged
if we include this group in our analysis.
10See Gomme et al. (2004) for similar results for several OECD countries.
1015-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64
US
cyclical
volatility 4.691 2.577 1.766 1.424 1.000 1.077 0.927
%o fe m p l . 6.72 12.30 12.89 24.82 22.27 16.38 4.62
%o fe m p l .
volatility
19.04 19.15 13.76 21.35 13.46 10.66 2.59
JapanA cyclical
volatility 6.821 1.642 1.321 1.095 1.000 1.400 2.957
%o fe m p l . 2.91 10.77 11.45 22.75 23.22 17.96 10.93
%o fe m p l .
volatility




4.198 2.327 1.693 1.311 1.000 0.907 1.174
%o fe m p l . 7.46 12.37 13.53 26.61 22.41 14.34 3.29
%o fe m p l .
volatility




9.195 6.626 2.985 1.676 1.000 1.812 4.320
%o fe m p l . 2.75 10.36 13.70 27.27 25.21 17.49 3.21
%o fe m p l .
volatility




3.222 3.426 2.550 1.643 1.000 1.264 7.073
%o fe m p l . 7.82 12.66 11.96 24.57 23.48 16.27 3.25
%o fe m p l .
volatility




6.452 4.101 2.125 1.169 1.000 2.466 3.176
%o fe m p l . 7.70 8.41 12.45 28.05 24.43 15.94 3.02
%o fc y c l i c a l
employment
22.93 15.91 12.20 15.13 11.27 18.13 4.43
UKB cyclical
volatility 5.464 3.351 2.072 1.654 1.000 1.502 2.350
%o fe m p l . 6.54 10.90 12.37 25.28 23.51 17.37 4.03
%o fe m p l .
volatility
17.97 18.38 12.89 21.04 11.83 13.13 4.77
Table 2.3: Relative Business Cycle Volatility of Employment by Age Group. A:
60 - 64 age group replaced by 60+. B: 15 - 19 age group replaced by 16 - 19.
11siveness of market work are an empirical regularity in our sample of industrialized
economies. Our ﬁndings extend the results of Clark and Summers (1981), Ríos-
Rull (1996), and Gomme et al. (2004) for the U.S. to the rest of the G7. That
these economies diﬀer greatly in terms of industry composition and the degree of
labor market regulation makes this ﬁnding all the more striking. These results
suggest that the age composition of the labor force is potentially a key determi-
nant of the responsiveness of an economy to business cycle shocks. In the next
section, we conﬁrm this conjecture.
3. Age Composition and Business Cycle Volatility
We employ panel-data methods to study the relationship between cyclical volatil-
ity and demographics in the G7. Our identiﬁcation comes from cross-country
diﬀerences in the extent and timing of demographic changes. As a rough sum-
mary of these changes, Figure 2 presents birth rates for three of the G7 countries.
In the U.S. and Canada, the postwar baby boom led to an unusually large co-
hort of “20-something” labor market entrants in the mid- to late-1970s, and subse-
quently a large cohort of prime-aged labor market participants beginning around
1990. In France, Italy, and Germany, the baby boom was less pronounced, and
changes in age composition have been less dramatic. Instead, declining fertility
(which accelerated in the late-1960s) has resulted in a gradual aging of the labor
force. The demographic experience of the U.K. falls somewhere in between those
of North America and continental Europe, so the changes in age composition there
are intermediate to those just described. In Japan, a sharp and rapid decline in
fertility occurred after WWII, leading to a marked drop in the number of young
workers entering the labor force after the early-1970s. In addition, population
aging led to an increasing share of workforce participants over the age of 60; this
has been particularly pronounced since 1980.
12Figure 3 depicts the share of the labor force composed of individuals aged 15-29
years old for the same three countries as Figure 2. Comparing these two ﬁgures,
it is clear that the primary factor driving changes in labor force composition since
WWII is changes in fertility.
We use this variation in demographic change to determine the average impact
of workforce age composition on business cycle volatility. The obvious related
question is how changes in the age distribution aﬀect output volatility in speciﬁc
countries. Given the extensive literature on the moderation of U.S. business cycles
experienced over the past 20 years, and the relevance of our results to this issue,
we defer that discussion to the following sections.
Our baseline measure for the age distribution is the share of the labor force by
various age groups. We look at labor force shares since this reﬂects our interest in
the role of diﬀerential market work volatility by age in aﬀecting macroeconomic
volatility. We are able to interpret our empirical results as causal, insofar as labor
force shares are exogenous to the determinants of business cycle volatility. The
close correlation between Figures 2 and 3 indicates that the low frequency move-
ments in workforce shares are driven by movements in population age composition.
Since population composition is determined largely by fertility decisions made at
least 15 years earlier, this component of labor force shares is exogenous to current
business cycle conditions. This leaves the potential endogeneity of age-speciﬁc
labor force participation rates and international migration to cyclical volatility
unaccounted for. In our analysis (see below), we pursue two formal approaches to
address these issues.
It is obviously diﬃcult to obtain a direct, point-in-time measure of cycli-
cal volatility or, more abstractly, an economy’s responsiveness to business cycle
shocks. Therefore, we consider the approach pursued in the literature by measur-
ing cyclical volatility at quarter t as the standard deviation of ﬁltered real GDP
13during a 41-quarter (10-year) window centered around quarter t. We adopt the
HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600 as a benchmark; to demonstrate robust-
ness, we also present results for volatility measures constructed with other ﬁlters
and time windows.11
The benchmark regression we consider is:
σit = αi + βt + γshareit + εit, (3.1)
where σit is our measure of business cycle volatility for country i at year t,a n d
shareit is the particular (vector of) labor force share measure(s) under considera-
tion. We account for unobserved heterogeneity in volatility via the country ﬁxed
eﬀect, αi. We include a full set of time dummies, βt, which allows us to control for
time-varying factors aﬀecting volatility that are common across countries. This
also implies that our identiﬁcation of γ is through age composition change that is
not shared across countries over time.12
We are interested in this regression for the following reason. The estimated
value of γ is informative with respect to the average eﬀect of labor force shares on
output volatility. However, it does not identify the speciﬁc economic mechanisms
generating this relationship. For instance, changes in age composition can aﬀect
the volatility of market work (and thus, the volatility of output) in two ways.
First, changes in the age structure have a direct composition eﬀect, changing
the relative shares of stable (prime-aged) and volatile (young and old) workers
11See Appendix A for data sources. Because of limitations in data availability, our time cov-
erage diﬀers from country to country, so our sample represents an unbalanced panel. Annual
observations for labor force shares are available from national labor force surveys, and were
obtained from various published and unpublished sources. Quarterly real GDP is used to con-
struct the cyclical volatility measures; annual time series were constructed by selecting the value
for the second quarter of each year. Essentially identical results obtain when we annualize by
averaging over quarters.
12See Blanchard and Simon (2001) for a similar empirical speciﬁcation, studying the relation-
ship between inﬂation and output volatility.
14in the aggregate. Second, changes in the age structure can have a more indirect
eﬀect, changing the volatility of hours and employment of speciﬁc age groups. Our
benchmark regression does not identify the relative contributions of such direct
and indirect eﬀects, but identiﬁes the sign and magnitude of the total eﬀect. We
return to this discussion in Section 4, after presenting results for our benchmark
regression, given in equation (3.1).
3.1. A First Cut
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation we consider is one where share is the fraction of the 15 - 64
year old labor force accounted for by 15 - 29 year olds plus 60 - 64 year olds. Given
the U-shaped pattern in market work volatility as a function of age documented in
Section 2, we refer to this measure as the volatile-aged labor force share. We view
this speciﬁcation as a simple and informative “ﬁrst cut” to illustrate the average
eﬀect of the age distribution on business cycle volatility in the G7. We discuss
the robustness of our results to alternative deﬁnitions of the volatile-aged below,
and we present results using a more detailed treatment of the age distribution in
the following subsection.
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, Figures 4 and 5 present the time
series of cyclical volatility, σi, and the volatile-aged labor force share, sharei,
for the U.S. and Japan, 1963 - 1999. Given our construction of σi, this includes
output data from 1958 to 2004. In both countries, the two series track each other
very closely. In the U.S., output volatility rose from the early 1960s to 1978, then
fell from 1978 to present. This pattern is matched by the labor force share of
the young. The hump in the labor force share that peaks in 1978 is due to the
entrance of baby boomers into the workforce.
However, this correlation could be spurious, because of such factors as insta-
bility of oil prices and monetary policy in the 1970s. In this respect, a cross-
15country analysis disciplines our inference: in our panel regression, the eﬀect of
labor force shares is identiﬁed through diﬀerences in demographic change across
countries. Consider Japan, which similarly experienced postwar moderation in
output volatility and aging of the workforce, but with quite a diﬀerent evolution.
In contrast to the U.S., Japan’s business cycle volatility fell beginning in 1971 and
accelerated in the late 1970s. After stabilizing in the early 1980s, volatility has
since risen. Again, this pattern is closely tracked by Japan’s volatile-aged labor
force share. The fact that these changes in demographics and volatility represent
a “mirror image” of the U.S. strongly suggests that the correlation is not spurious.
Figures 6 and 7 present the same series for all G7 countries. In each panel, the
scale of the vertical axes is identical in order to facilitate comparison. In six of the
seven countries, business cycle volatility and the volatile labor force share clearly
covary, although there is a slight phase shift in Canada. In France, unconditional
evidence of this relationship is weaker, but relative to the other countries there is
little change in volatility to explain.
Table 3.1 presents estimation results on γ, the average eﬀect of the labor force
measure on business cycle volatility. Column 1 presents our benchmark OLS
estimate. The share of volatile-aged workforce participants has a positive eﬀect
on business cycle volatility. To interpret the magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimate,
a 10% increase in this labor force share would increase cyclical volatility by 0.40.13
We estimate this eﬀect to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The result in Column 1 suﬀers from autocorrelated residuals. This is due
in part to the construction of our measure of cyclical volatility, which results in
overlap of output data in consecutive observations of σit.T oa d d r e s st h i s ,w er u n
standard tests on the regression residuals to determine the highest order of serial
13Again, we delay discussion of this result in relation to the U.S. Great Moderation to the
following section.
1612345 6 7
HPA,F HPA,N HPB,N FDA,N FDB,N BP(hi)A,N BP(lo)A,N
ˆ γ 4.022∗∗∗ 4.022∗∗∗ 4.955∗∗∗ 2.090∗∗∗ 2.250∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗ 2.507∗∗∗
(0.792) (1.134) (1.500) (0.693) (0.996) (0.704) (0.936)
Nobs 207 207 213 207 213 180 180
A and B: 41qtr and 21qtr window used to construct dependent variable, respectively.
F and N: OLS and Newey-West robust standard error, respectively.
** and ***: signiﬁcant at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3.1: Eﬀect of Volatile Group Shares on Business Cycle Volatility. All re-
gressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses.
correlation. For the benchmark speciﬁcation, we cannot reject a highest order of
two. In Column 2, we report results when heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors are constructed using the Newey-West estimator. Again,
the eﬀect of the labor force share on cyclical volatility is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The standard errors reported throughout the remainder of the paper are
corrected in the same manner.
To illustrate robustness, Table 3.1 reports coeﬃcient estimates when we change
the way that cyclical volatility is measured. In Columns 3 and 5, we shrink the
window of observations used to measure volatility, from 41 to 21 quarters. In
Columns 4 and 5, we consider real output detrended by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing; relative
to the HP ﬁlter, this ampliﬁes high frequency ﬂuctuations. Finally, we take the
frequencies that the HP ﬁlter passes (those higher than 32 quarters), and split
them approximately in two: we isolate ﬂuctuations with frequency between 2 and
16 quarters, and those between 17 and 32 quarters. We do this with the BP ﬁlter
and, for brevity, report in Columns 6 and 7 only the results for the 41-quarter
window (the results using the 21-quarter window are virtually identical). The
estimated eﬀect of the volatile-aged labor force share on all measures is positive
17and signiﬁcant at either the 5% or 1% level. Finally, note that the magnitude of
the coeﬃcient estimates cannot be compared across columns since the deﬁnition
of the dependent variable diﬀers.
The results in Table 3.1 are potentially subject to endogeneity problems be-
cause any group’s labor force share depends on its participation rate, which in
turn may depend on (country-speciﬁc) shocks determining output volatility. En-
dogeneity bias results if the response of labor force participation to these shocks
diﬀers across age groups. To investigate this, we present instrumental variables
(IV) results in which each country’s volatile-aged labor force share is instrumented
by its population share of 15 - 29 and 60 - 64 year olds.
The ﬁrst column in Table 3.2, Panel A repeats our benchmark OLS result
from Table 3.1. Column 2 presents our estimate when workforce shares are in-
strumented by population shares. Again, the eﬀect of the volatile group’s labor
force share is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In fact, the estimated co-
eﬃcient changes little from our OLS result. Using the Hausman test, we cannot
reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity bias in our original labor force measure.
Our second IV approach goes further toward addressing the possibility that
the population age distribution is endogenous as well. This would occur if the
response of international migration to shocks determining output volatility dif-
fered across age groups. To address this, we instrument our labor force measures
by lagged birth rates. The motivation for this is straightforward. Excluding mi-
gration, an age group’s share of the 15 - 64 year old population is determined
by the distribution of births 15 to 64 years prior.14 Since past fertility is almost
certainly exogenous to current macroeconomic volatility, instrumenting by lagged
birth rates allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal impact of labor




OLS IV1 IV2 BP OLS IV2
A. annual
ˆ γ 4.022∗∗∗ 3.635∗∗∗ 3.946∗∗∗ 4.284∗∗∗ 5.430∗∗∗ 5.381∗∗∗
(1.134) (1.424) (1.138) (1.203) (1.095) (1.089)
Nobs 207 207 207 207 203 203
B. 4-year
ˆ γ 4.306∗∗∗ 3.411∗ 4.272∗∗∗ 4.532∗∗∗ 5.728∗∗∗ 5.447∗∗∗
(1.427) (1.987) (1.422) (1.596) (1.390) (1.379)
Nobs 55 55 55 55 53 53
* and ***: signiﬁcant at 10% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3.2: Eﬀect of Volatile Group Shares on Business Cycle Volatility: Addi-
tional Robustness Checks. All regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects and time
dummies. Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
force composition.
We instrument by projecting the volatile-aged labor force share on 20-year, 30-
year, 40-year, 50-year, and 60-year lagged birth rates. The results are presented
in Column 3 of Table 3.2. Again, the estimated eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, and the magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimate is similar to the
original OLS result.
Using population shares and lagged birth rates as instruments is problematic,
though, if demographics aﬀect cyclical volatility, independent of their inﬂuence
on labor force composition. This is possible if, for example, diﬀerential demand
for investment and durable goods or diﬀerential impacts of borrowing constraints
across age groups have important business cycle eﬀects. In this case, population
measures may not constitute valid instruments for labor force shares.
Given this, we consider an alternative approach to addressing the potential
endogeneity of labor force measures: we simply remove the medium and high fre-
quency variation in the volatile-aged labor force share. Using the BP ﬁlter, we
19discard all ﬂuctuations at frequencies greater than 20 years.15 This corresponds
to the view that endogeneity arises from unobserved shocks, simultaneously de-
termining labor force shares and business cycle volatility. In this case, it should
suﬃce to restrict our attention only to low frequency variation in workforce com-
position caused by factors such as demographic change that are orthogonal to
cyclical volatility shocks. Column 4 of Table 3.2, Panel A reports the result of
this exercise. Again, the coeﬃcient estimate is positive and signiﬁcant, and is very
similar to our benchmark result.
In addition, we add to our benchmark speciﬁcation the regressors considered by
Blanchard and Simon (2001). Blanchard and Simon conclude that inﬂation volatil-
ity displays a strong, and potentially causal, relationship with output volatility.
This conclusion is based on panel-data analysis similar to ours. In their analysis,
output volatility is regressed on the mean and standard deviation of inﬂation,
along with country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The inﬂation volatility coeﬃcient is
found to be large and statistically signiﬁcant.
As Blanchard and Simon acknowledge, concern arises from the endogeneity of
inﬂation measures and output volatility. This bias makes inference problematic.
Consequently, when we include measures of average inﬂation and inﬂation volatil-
ity in our analysis, we do not view the magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimates as
particularly informative. The point is simply to illustrate that our results are
robust to concerns of spurious correlation between labor force composition and
output volatility.16 The OLS estimate from this exercise is reported in Column 5
15We implement this using the BP ﬁlter proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). See
Christiano and Fitzgerald for a discussion of the merits of their method for isolating ﬂuctuations
outside of the “business cycle frequencies” relative to Baxter and King (1999).
16The previous discussion on validity of population measures as instruments raises another pos-
sibility for spurious correlation: namely, that demographic change has aﬀected cyclical volatility
through channels unrelated to labor market considerations. Since inference on any hypothesis
regarding the role of demographics likely relies on exogenous variation in population measures, it
is very diﬃcult to provide direct evidence to rule this out. However, the results of the following
20of Table 3.2, Panel A; Column 6 reports the estimate when the labor force mea-
sure is instrumented by lagged birth rates. Including the inﬂation measures does
not alter the sign or the statistical signiﬁcance of the original ﬁndings (the results
for the IV1 and BP exercises are virtually identical).
Our last experiment concerns the “spacing” or temporal frequency of obser-
vations. The demographic change underlying our inference is a gradual process.
Consequently, perhaps meaningful variation in our labor force measure obtains
only at longer time horizons. This concern is addressed in Panel B of Table
3.2. We repeat our analysis, this time with annual observations spaced four years
apart.17 Columns 1 through 4 present coeﬃcient estimates for our benchmark
OLS, IV, and BP-ﬁltered cases, respectively. Note that this change does not sub-
stantively aﬀect our results; in fact, it only serves to strengthen our conclusion of
a positive link between the volatile group’s labor force share and output volatility.
Results from including inﬂa t i o nm e a s u r e sa sr e g r e s s o r sa r ea l s ou n c h a n g e d .
Finally, we consider alternative deﬁnitions of the volatile-aged labor force share
guided by our results in Section 2. In the U.S. and Canada, despite the fact that 60
- 64 year olds display greater volatility than the prime-aged, their contribution to
total employment volatility is smaller than their contribution to total employment.
As such, we redeﬁne the volatile-aged in these countries as only 15 - 29 year olds.
Also, the results in Section 2 indicate that, unlike in other countries, in Japan the
65+ year olds are signiﬁcant contributors to the volatility of aggregate hours and
employment. Therefore, we redeﬁne sharei for Japan as the fraction of the 15+
workforce accounted for by 15 - 29 and 60+ year olds. Considering these changes,
both separately and simultaneously, does not change any of the results reported
subsection suggest that such spurious correlation is unlikely.
17We choose this relative to a more conventional 5-year spacing for practical reasons: given the
unbalanced nature of our panel, this one-year drop in frequency results in a disproportionately
l a r g ed r o pi nt h en u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n s .
21in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Taken together, we interpret the results of this subsection
as convincing evidence of a positive eﬀect of the labor force share of volatile aged
individuals on business cycle volatility.
3.2. Looking at the Entire Age Distribution
Up to this point the results indicate that periods with a larger share of age groups
with cyclically sensitive market work tend to display greater business cycle volatil-
ity. In this section, we extend our analysis to include a more detailed look at the
eﬀect of the labor force age composition.
In particular, we use the entire age distribution of the labor force as the re-
gressor in (3.1). This is motivated by our results in Section 2: namely, there is a
U-shaped pattern in the cyclical volatility of hours and employment as a function
of age. Our intent is to determine whether there is a similar U-shaped eﬀect of
age shares on aggregate output volatility. This would support our view that the
shape of the entire age distribution aﬀects the responsiveness of an economy to
business cycle shocks, and that the crucial channel of inﬂuence is via diﬀerences
in the cyclical sensitivity of market work across age groups.
We therefore alter our benchmark speciﬁcation so that the regressor, share,
is a vector of labor force shares: the shares of the 30 - 39, 40 - 49, 50 - 59, and 60
- 64 year old age groups. Because shares sum to one, we exclude the 15 - 29 year
olds for the obvious reason. This implies that the coeﬃcient on any particular
age group represents the change in cyclical volatility that results from a shift of
workforce share out of the 15 - 29 group, into that age group.
Row 1 of Table 3.3 presents our benchmark OLS result. Relative to our conjec-
ture, the estimated coeﬃcients have the expected sign and magnitude. A decrease
in the share of 15 - 29 year olds in favor of any other age group reduces business
cycle volatility. Moreover, the eﬀect is U-shaped as a function of age. The smallest
2230-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 Nobs
1O L S−3.026∗ −4.058∗∗∗ −6.226∗∗∗ −0.716 207
(1.672) (1.489) (2.086) (4.371)
2I V 1−3.237∗∗ −4.177∗∗∗ −6.440∗∗∗ −0.588 207
(1.680) (1.485) (2.165) (4.448)
3I V 2−2.935∗ −4.010∗∗∗ −6.039∗∗∗ −1.018 207
(1.676) (1.500) (2.077) (4.406)
4B P −2.745 −4.335∗∗∗ −6.769∗∗∗ −0.614 207
(1.739) (1.674) (2.520) (4.658)
*, **, and *** signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3.3: Eﬀect of the Age Distribution on Business Cycle Volatility, annual
observations. All regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects and time dummies.
Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
reduction in volatility comes from shifting young workforce members into the 60
- 64 age group, although this eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This is
consistent with our results in Section 2, indicating that both the young and the old
tend to contribute disproportionately to aggregate employment volatility in the
G7. By contrast, shifting labor force shares out of the young and into prime-aged
groups results in large and statistically signiﬁcant reductions in cyclical volatility.
Again, this is consistent with the U-shape in market work volatility.
We conduct additional experiments by varying the excluded age group, one at a
time, from the regression. This allows us to determine the statistical signiﬁcance of
diﬀerences across age-group pairs. For brevity we do not report these results, but
summarize them as follows: broadly speaking, the biggest diﬀerences in volatility
eﬀects are between either the 15 - 29 or 60 - 64 age groups (Set 1) and either the
40 - 49 or 50 - 59 age groups (Set 2). Across Set 1 and Set 2, the diﬀerence in
coeﬃcient estimates for any pair of age groups is large and statistically signiﬁcant.
On the other hand, for pairs within Sets 1 and 2, the estimated diﬀerence is small
and insigniﬁcant. The 30 - 39 year olds represent an intermediate group. When
23this group is excluded, the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% and 10%
levels for the 50 - 59s and 15 - 29s, respectively, and is insigniﬁcant for the 40 -
49s and 60 - 64s.
Though the results are not reported here, we also experiment using diﬀerent
splits in age groups to ensure robustness. For instance, we split the young into 2
groups, those aged 15 - 24 and those aged 25 - 29. This has minimal impact on the
results. Again, we obtain a U-shaped impact of workforce age shares on cyclical
volatility. In fact, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the estimated eﬀect
of 15 - 24 and 25 - 29 year olds. Other splits yield similar results, and maintain
the U-shaped pattern. Finally, we repeat the robustness checks of the previous
subsection by considering diﬀerent deﬁnitions of business cycle volatility. Again,
the results are not sensitive to the details of the detrending of output or the size
of the window used in computing volatility.
In the remaining rows of Table 3.3 we report robustness checks that address the
potential endogeneity of labor force shares. In Row 2 we present IV estimates using
population shares as instruments; in Row 3 we present IV estimates using lagged
birth rates (see the previous subsection for details). The results are hardly changed
relative to Row 1. Again, in formal testing we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the labor force shares do not suﬀer from endogeneity bias. Row 4 presents the
results when we BP-ﬁlter the workforce shares to retain only ﬂuctuations with
periodicity greater than 20 years, as described in the previous subsection. Again,
the eﬀect on business cycle volatility is U-shaped as a function of age.
Table 3.4 presents the same estimates as Table 3.3, but using observations
spaced 4 years apart. Again, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant age group eﬀects and a U-shaped
pattern in coeﬃcient estimates as a function of age. Finally, we include measures
of average inﬂation and inﬂation volatility in our analysis, although the results are
not reported here. Again, our results regarding the sign and statistical signiﬁcance
2430-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 Nobs
1O L S−3.394 −3.964∗ −6.424∗∗ 2.730 55
(2.455) (2.065) (2.817) (6.555)
2I V 1−3.262 −3.901∗ −6.283∗∗ 2.866 55
(2.479) (2.068) (2.796) (6.566)
3I V 2−3.193 −4.086∗∗ −6.147∗∗ 2.633 55
(2.436) (2.066) (2.741) (6.524)
4B P−2.789 −4.391∗ −6.910∗ 3.371 55
(2.513) (2.327) (3.680) (7.192)
* and ** signiﬁcant at 10% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 3.4: Eﬀect of the Age Distribution on Business Cycle Volatility, 4-year
spaced observations. All regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects and time dum-
mies. Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.
of the coeﬃcient estimates are unchanged.
We view this as strong support for our hypothesis that the age distribution of
the labor force has important implications for business cycle volatility. Moreover,
these results indicate the robustness of the U-shaped impact of age shares on
business cycle volatility.
Given the U-shaped pattern documented in Section 2, we view this as convinc-
ing evidence that the inﬂuence of demographic composition on volatility operates
through diﬀerences in the cyclical sensitivity of hours and employment across age
groups. The pattern of market work volatility as a function of age represents a nat-
ural explanation for the U-shaped impact of age shares on business cycle volatility.
Indeed, any other hypothesis regarding the impact of demographic composition
on output volatility would need to rationalize this pattern.
4. The Great Moderation: Quantitative Accounting
Since the mid-1980s the U.S. has undergone a substantial decline in business cycle
volatility, as shown in Figure 4. Indeed, determining the causes of “The Great
25Moderation” is the objective of a growing body of literature. Potential expla-
nations include a reduction in inﬂation volatility that is potentially related to
improved monetary policy (see, for instance, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000;
Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock and Watson, 2002); regulatory changes and
ﬁnancial market innovation related to household borrowing (Campbell and Her-
cowitz, 2006; Fisher and Gervais, 2006; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006), changes
that have reduced the volatility of production relative to sales (McConnell and
Perez-Quiros, 2000; Ramey and Vine, 2006); and good luck, in the form of a
reduction in the variance of business cycle shocks (Stock and Watson, 2002 and
2003; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006; Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian, 2006).
In this section, we take a ﬁrst step at quantifying the role of demographic
change in accounting for the Great Moderation. In the following section, we
discuss a quantitative theoretical approach which takes a speciﬁcs t a n c eo nt h e
impulses and propagation mechanisms generating cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Our ﬁrst exercise simply involves interpreting the coeﬃcient estimates from
our G7 panel regressions. Business cycle volatility peaks in the U.S. in 1978. This
year coincides with the peak in the 15 - 29 year old labor force share at 38.5%.
Cyclical volatility then falls rapidly during the 1980s, coinciding with a fall in the
share of the young in the labor force as baby boomers enter their 40s and 50s. By
1999, the 15 - 29 year old share was only 27.1%, representing a level reduction
of 11.4% from 1978. From our OLS estimates in Table 3.3, it follows that such a
shift in workforce composition — from the 15 - 29 age group into the 40 - 49 age
group — predicts a volatility reduction of 0.114 × 4.058 = 0.463. Given that our
measure of cyclical volatility fell from 2.379 to 0.955 between 1978 and 1999, this
change in age composition accounts for roughly 32% of the moderation between
these two dates.
Finally, we present a simple decomposition exercise to determine how much
26of the change in aggregate market work volatility is attributable to the change in
workforce age composition. We use the data analyzed in Section 2 and compare
the volatility of HP-ﬁltered measures between 1967 - 1984 and 1985 - 2004.
The standard deviation of per capita aggregate employment ﬂuctuations fell
54.7 log points across the two periods. To isolate the eﬀect due purely to the
change in composition, we construct a counterfactual series for per capita aggre-















t is per capita employment (or the employment rate) of 15 - 19 year
olds, e20
t is the employment rate of 20 - 24 year olds, and so on, progressing in 5
year age groups; e65
t is the employment rate of 65+ year olds at date t,a n dpx
t
is the population share of age group x. The counterfactual series are constructed
using the historically observed age-speciﬁc employment rates, {ex
t}, but setting
the population shares constant. Our exercise holds the age composition ﬁxed at
















Doing this for every year, 1967-2004, generates a counterfactual time series {ˆ e1978
t }.
We compare the standard deviation of ﬁltered counterfactual employment
across the pre- and post-moderation periods. Had the age composition stayed
constant at the level observed in 1978, the standard deviation would have fallen by
only 40.2 log points. That is, the change in age composition explains (54.7 − 40.2)÷
54.7 or 26% of the moderation in aggregate employment volatility. Performing the
same experiment for hours worked, we ﬁnd that 21% o fi t sm o d e r a t i o ni sd u et o
demographic change.
Is this exercise informative? Note that the decomposition assumes that the
volatility of age-speciﬁc employment and hours worked are independent of the
27age composition. That is, it assumes the absence of indirect eﬀects of changing
age structure on aggregate volatility via changes in the volatility of age-speciﬁc
employment and hours worked.
To determine whether this is reasonable, we test for the presence of such eﬀects
using cross-country regression analysis similar to that considered in Section 3. For
example, we regress the volatility of employment of 15 - 29 year olds on the 15
- 29 year old labor force share, controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects and factors
aﬀecting business cycle volatility common across countries. We ﬁnd that a 10%
increase in the share of 15 - 29 year olds decreases the standard deviation of
their employment by 0.0007%;t h i si sn o te s t i m a t e dt ob ed i ﬀerent from zero at
conventional signiﬁcance levels. For brevity, we do not report results for other
age groups since, again, the eﬀects are estimated to be small in magnitude and
statistically insigniﬁcant. Hence, we ﬁnd no strong evidence for these indirect
eﬀects in the G7 sample.
To conclude, note that the results of the decomposition exercise on aggregate
market work volatility are similar in magnitude to the role of demographic change
in the moderation of output volatility derived from our panel regression analysis.
We take this as evidence for an important role for demographics in explaining the
Great Moderation.
5. Modeling the Great Moderation
The ﬁrst challenge in quantifying the role of demographic change in the Great
Moderation is developing a framework that generates age-group diﬀerences in
the cyclical volatility of hours worked. For comparability with the literature,
we present a model that represents a minimal deviation from the standard real
business cycle (RBC) model. Within the RBC framework, diﬀerences across age
groups can arise from diﬀerences in preferences (or succinctly, diﬀerences in labor
28supply), factors relating to technology (labor demand), or both.18
In this section we present a simple model that abstracts from diﬀerences in
labor supply characteristics. Rather, we show that focusing on diﬀerences in
labor demand faced by age groups captures diﬀerences in hours ﬂuctuations in
U.S. data surprisingly well.19 Moreover, in Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu (2007)
(hereafter JPS), we show that labor demand diﬀerences are crucial for matching
diﬀerences in the cyclicality of age-speciﬁc wages. We document that while all
wages are procyclical, wages of young workers are more volatile over the cycle
than those of others; a model with diﬀerences in labor supply alone would have
diﬃculty replicating this.20 For brevity, we keep the presentation to a minimum
and refer the reader to JPS for further discussion.
18Note that most RBC models are not conducive to addressing cyclical variation in hours
worked due to variation in labor force participation. In Jaimovich, Pruitt and Siu (2007),
we conduct the standard decomposition of the variance of age-speciﬁc hours into components
owing to ﬂuctuations in hours per worker (intensive margin), workers per labor force member
(extensive margin), and labor force members per age group member (participation margin). We
ﬁnd that the participation margin is the primary source of the total variance in hours for only
those aged 60+. This age group’s hours account for only a small fraction of the aggregate, and
their hours ﬂuctuations are not highly correlated with the cycle. Given this, we view abstracting
from variation in participation as a reasonable ﬁr s ts t e pi nm o d e l i n ga g e - g r o u pd i ﬀerences in
the volatility of hours worked.
19See Ríos-Rull (1996) and Gomme et al. (2004) for models highlighting diﬀerences in labor
supply due to life-cycle considerations. They show that life-cycle mechanisms successfully explain
volatility diﬀerences between prime-aged and old workers; however, such considerations cannot
fully account for the volatility of young workers. See Castro and Coen-Pirani (2006) who also
emphasize the role of labor demand factors for diﬀerences in the cyclical volatility of hours by
education levels; see also Gomme et al. (2004) for discussion on the potential role of labor
demand diﬀerences. Finally, see Nagypál (2004) for an alternative approach highlighting the
interaction between age and worker-occupation match quality.
20In particular, consider a model with just young and old agents. If hours are perfectly
substitutable and wages are competitive, it is obvious that both young and old wages share
identical cyclical properties. Now, suppose young and old hours are distinct factor inputs. The
observed procyclicality of hours and wages of both young and old implies a cycle driven by
shocks to labor demand. Matching the relative volatility of hours requires a greater elasticity of
labor supply (or a smaller income eﬀect) to wage changes for young agents. However, without
diﬀerences in the magnitude of cyclical shocks to labor demand, this implies counterfactually
smaller ﬂuctuations in young wages.
29For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of workers, young
and old; we abstract from diﬀerences between the prime-aged and retirement-
aged by combining them in the “old” group.21 We posit that an individual’s
age directly determines his or her labor market experience, so that all young
workers are “inexperienced” while all old workers are “experienced.” Production
exhibits capital-experience complementarity. With this technology, diﬀerences in
the cyclical demand for experienced and inexperienced labor arise naturally. The
intuition for this is straightforward. As an extreme case, suppose that capital and
old/experienced labor are perfect complements, while capital and young / inexpe-
rienced labor display some substitutability. If capital services are a state variable
and ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizing and price-taking, then any shock generating a
change in inputs results only in variation in the quantity of young labor.
The primary challenge is matching observed diﬀerences in hours volatility.
As will be clear, it is trivial to parameterize the model explicitly to do so. To
discipline our analysis, we estimate the key parameters governing the degree of
capital-experience complementarity in a manner that does not target diﬀerences
in the cyclical volatility of hours. Performing counterfactuals, we ﬁnd that even
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21In Section 2, we found that while 65+ year olds display greater hours volatility, their con-
tribution to aggregate hours volatility is small.
30Here HYt is labor input of young or inexperienced workers, HOt is labor input
of old or experienced workers, and Kt is capital services hired at date t. Labor-
augmenting technology follows a deterministic growth path with persistent tran-
sitory shocks:
At =e x p( gt+ zt),
zt = φzt−1 + εt, 0 <φ<1,
where E (ε)=0 , 0 ≤ var(ε)=σ2
ε < ∞,a n dg>0 is the trend growth rate of
technology.
The elasticity of substitution between experienced workers and capital is given
by (1 − ρ)
−1, while the elasticity of substitution between inexperienced workers
and the HO-K composite is (1 − σ)
−1. Following Krusell et al. (2000), we deﬁne
production as exhibiting capital-experience complementarity when σ>ρ .22
Firms rent capital, and young and old workers’ time, from perfectly competi-
tive factor markets to maximize proﬁts:
Πt ≡ Yt − rtKt − WYtHYt− WOtHOt.
Here rt is the capital rental rate, WYtis the wage rate of young workers, and WOt
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22The large body of literature on capital-skill complementarity has concentrated on education
as a proxy for skill (see Krusell et al., 2000, and the references therein). In this model we
concentrate on the other signiﬁcant dimension of skill emphasized in Mincerian wage regressions,
namely labor market experience.
315.1.2. Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely-lived house-
holds. Each household is composed of a unit mass of family members; sY denotes
the share of family members that are young. Young family members derive utility
from consumption, CY, and disutility from hours spent working, NY.O l d f a m -
ily members have similar preferences deﬁned over consumption, CO, and working
hours, NO.




















sYCYj+( 1− sY)COj + ˜ Kj+1 =( 1− δ) ˜ Kj + rj ˜ Kj+
sYWYjNYj+( 1− sY)WOjNOj, ∀j ≥ t.
We normalize the time endowment of all family members to unity, so that 0 ≤
NYt≤ 1 and 0 ≤ NOt ≤ 1. The household takes all prices as given.
Because of additive separability in preferences, optimality entails equating
consumption across all family members:
CYt= COt = Ct. (5.1)

















Condition (5.1) implies that the income eﬀect of a consumption change on labor
supply is equal across young and old workers. In our benchmark calibration, we
set θY = θO so that the substitution eﬀect of wage changes on labor supply is
equated across workers. Adopting identical income and substitution eﬀects allows
us to isolate the role of capital-experience complementarity in generating volatility
diﬀerences across young and old workers.
5.1.3. Equilibrium
Equilibrium is deﬁned as follows. Given ˜ K0 > 0 and the stochastic process, {zt},
a competitive equilibrium is an allocation, {Ct,N Yt,N Ot, ˜ Kt+1,Y t,H Yt,H Ot,
Kt}, and a price system, {WYt,W Ot,r t}, such that: given prices, the allocation
solves both the representative household’s problem and the representative ﬁrm’s
problem; and factor markets clear for all t:
Kt = ˜ Kt; HYt= sYNYt; HOt =( 1− sY)NOt.
Walras’ law ensures clearing in the ﬁnal goods market:
Ct + Kt+1 = Yt +( 1− δ)Kt, ∀t.
Finally, for the purposes of model evaluation, we deﬁne aggregate hours worked
as Ht = sYHYt+( 1− sY)HOt.
5.2. Quantitative Speciﬁcation
For comparability with the RBC literature, we adopt a standard calibration proce-
dure as closely as possible. However, the model’s parameters governing elasticities
of substitution in production, σ and ρ, cannot be calibrated to match standard
33ﬁrst-moments in the U.S. data. Instead, we adopt a structural estimation pro-
cedure to identify these values using NIPA and CPS data. After discussing the
procedure, we discuss calibration of the remaining parameters in Subsection 5.2.2.
5.2.1. Structural Estimation
Our strategy entails estimating σ from the model’s aggregate labor demand equa-
tion.23 Consider the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the demand for
HYt r e w r i t t e ni nl o g g e d ,ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form:
∆logWYt= a0 +( σ − 1)∆log(HYt/Yt)+σut, (5.2)
where a0 is a constant, and ut is a function of current and lagged shocks:
ut = εt − (1 − φ)
¡




Hence, σ is determined from the response of WY to exogenous changes in HY and
Y .
Because the basic monthly CPS does not include information on hourly wages
until 1982, we estimate a variant of condition (5.2) for which data is available for
the entire period of interest. This is obtained by multiplying both sides of the
ﬁrst-order condition by HYt:
∆logLIYt= a1 + σ∆logHYt+( 1− σ)∆logYt + σut,
where LIYt ≡ WYtHYt denotes labor income earned by young workers. Annual
observations on respondents’ total labor income are available from the CPS March
supplement. Abstracting from endogeneity issues (see below), σ can be estimated
from a simple restricted least-squares regression. To estimate ρ,w ep r o c e e di na
23A similar approach is used in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995) and the references
therein.
34similar manner. Combining the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to HOt
and Kt and performing similar manipulations obtains:
∆log(QOt/QKt)=a2 + ρ∆log(HOt/Kt)+ρut, (5.3)
where QOt denotes the share of national income earned by old labor and QKt the
share of national income earned by capital.
This procedure does not require imposing any restrictions from the model’s
speciﬁcation of household behavior.24 The only assumptions required to pin down
σ and ρ are: (i) proﬁt maximization on the part of ﬁrms, and (ii) that factor
prices reﬂect marginal revenue products. No aspect of our approach imposes
σ>ρ ; whether this condition is satisﬁed depends on the relationship between
aggregate prices and quantities observed in the data.
The data used in estimation come from standard sources. Brieﬂy, Yt, Kt,a n d
QKt come from the BEA’s NIPA and Fixed Asset Tables. HYt, HOt, LIYt,a n d
QOt are constructed using March CPS data. Because of this, our data comprise
annual observations for the period 1968 - 2005. Given the results of Section 2,
we classify agents aged 15 - 29 as young and agents aged 30+ as old. Finally,
HYt is measured as eﬀective hours worked by 15 - 29 year olds and is derived
by weighting respondents’ raw hours using wages as relative weights; the same is
done for HOt. Our weighting procedure follows that of Krusell et al. (2000). See
JPS for a detailed discussion of the data.
To obtain unbiased estimates, we instrument our regressors in (5.2) and (5.3)
by variables unrelated to shocks shifting ﬁrms’ input demand, be they technology
shocks, ut, or other omitted factors. Speciﬁcally, we use lagged birth rates and the
Ramey-Shapiro dates (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Ramey, 2006) as instruments.
The Ramey-Shapiro dates correspond to dummy variables indicating the onset of
24We see this as a virtue, since our goal is to abstract from labor supply diﬀerences, and
isolate the quantitative role of diﬀerences in the cyclical demand for young and old labor.
35government spending increases due to war and military build-ups. Given Ramey
and Shapiro’s narrative approach in identiﬁcation, these dates are exogenous to
shocks to technology. Using lagged birth rates allows us to identify changes in
current labor supply caused by changes in past fertility that also are exogenous to
shifts in labor demand. Using this procedure, we obtain IV estimates of ˆ σ =0 .619
and ˆ ρ =0 .119 with standard errors of 0.207 and 0.313, respectively.25 Hence, we
use values of σ =0 .62 and ρ =0 .12 in our analysis.
5.2.2. Calibration
Given values for σ and ρ, we calibrate the remaining parameters in the standard
way. We set β =0 .995 so that each period corresponds to a quarter; θY = θO =0
so that all household members have Rogerson-Hansen preferences. We set δ =
0.023 to obtain an (annual) steady-state capital-to-output ratio of 3.
Our maintained hypothesis is that the Great Moderation is due to two factors:
a fall in the volatility of technology shocks, and a fall in the share of aggregate
hours worked by young agents.26 Therefore, we proceed as follows. We set μ and
λ to match the 1968 — 1984 national income shares of QK =0 .37 and QO =0 .47.
With values for {σ,ρ,μ,λ} and data on output and factor inputs, we back out
the implied technology series, {At}.27
We ﬁnd that the standard deviation of the technology shock falls by 73% across
the 1968 - 1984 and 1985 - 2004 periods, with very little change in persistence.
25See JPS for further discussion regarding validity of our instruments and robustness of our
IV estimates, and comparison with un-instrumented least squares results.
26See Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian (2006) who investigate the role of decreased Solow residual
volatility in the standard RBC model.
27Unfortunately, quarterly data on hours worked disaggregated by age are not available from
the CPS before 1976. As a result, we derive a semi-annual measure for technology using semi-
annual data on output, capital, and hours. Age-speciﬁc hours worked are constructed using data
from the March and October CPS. It can be veriﬁed easily that second-moment properties of
the business cycle component of output, aggregate hours, and the Solow residual are essentially
identical at quarterly and semi-annual frequencies.
36As such, we set φ =0 .93 in both periods and vary σε from 0.0087 to 0.0050 across
periods to match the observed volatility in {At}. In the pre-moderation period,
sY =0 .35 is set to match the average population share of young individuals in
1968 - 1984. NYs sand NOss are set to jointly match: the observed ratio of young-
to-old hours worked in 1968 - 1984, and a steady-state value for aggregate hours
of Hss = sYNYs s+( 1− sY)NOss =0 .3. To match the change in the share of
aggregate hours by young and old agents, we set sY =0 .27 and increase NOss by
12% in the post-moderation period to match the average values observed in 1985
- 2004.
5.3. Results
To evaluate the model’s predictions, we separately simulate data for the pre-
and post-moderation periods according to the calibration just described. Aside
from the changes to the shock process and demographics across periods, all other
parameters are held ﬁxed.
Table 5.1 presents second-moment statistics for HP-ﬁltered output and hours
worked for the U.S.; the ﬁrst column covers the 1968 - 1984 period, the second
column covers 1985 - 2004, and the third column presents the log diﬀerence. The
volatility of output and aggregate hours both exhibit drastic moderation, on the
order of a 75-log-point fall across the two periods. Interestingly, the fall in the
volatility of hours worked by young individuals has been smaller (only 47 log
points) so that, relative to output, the standard deviation of HY has actually
risen by 27 log points.
Panel B of Table 5.1 presents the same statistics for model simulated data.
For the benchmark calibration, the model generates volatility of young and old
hours relative to output that matches the average values (of approximately 1.6
and 0.75, respectively) found in the U.S. for the 1968 - 2004 period. Hence, in con-
37A. US data B. benchmark model C. counterfactual
pre post change pre post change post change
std(Y ) 1.99 0.95 −0.74 1.85 1.00 −0.62 1.06 −0.55
std(H) 1.90 0.90 −0.75 1.90 0.99 −0.66 1.09 −0.55
std(H)/std(Y ) 0.95 0.94 −0.01 1.03 0.99 −0.04 1.03 0
std(HY)/std(Y ) 1.38 1.79 +0.27 1.58 1.65 +0.04 1.58 0
std(HO)/std(Y ) 0.78 0.74 −0.04 0.76 0.80 +0.04 0.76 0
std(HY)/std(HO) 1.76 2.40 +0.31 2.07 2.08 +0.00 2.07 0
Table 5.1: Second Moment Statistics. A: US data, 1968-1984 and 1985-2004. B
and C: model generated values from the benchmark and conterfactual calibrations.
trast to almost all other RBC models, this model has no diﬃculty in matching the
fact that aggregate hours are nearly as volatile as output.28 The key diﬀerence is
the estimated elasticity of substitution between young hours and the K-HO com-
posite; this is greater than the value of one implied by the usual Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation between aggregate hours and capital. This suggests that heterogene-
ity of labor input in production has the potential to resolve the “hours volatility
puzzle” in the RBC literature (see, for instance, King and Rebelo, 1999; Gomme
et al., 2004; and JPS). Finally, note that the model does a good job of replicat-
ing the Great Moderation driven solely by changes in the volatility of shocks and
the share of young and old; speciﬁcally, the model generates moderation in the
volatility of aggregate output and hours that is 84% and 88% as large as those
found in the data.
T oa s s e s st h er o l eo fd e m o g r a p h i cc h a n g ei na c c o u n t i n gf o rt h em o d e l - g e n e r a t e d
moderation, we perform a counterfactual experiment similar to that of Section 4
where we found that demographic change accounts for 21% of the reduction in
aggregate hours volatility. We re-simulate data for the post-1985 period holding
28In addition, when calibrated to the entire 1968 - 2004 period, the model generates volatility
in aggregate output and hours, and age-speciﬁc hours similar to the U.S. data. See JPS for
details, as well as details on the model’s implications for the cyclicality of age-speciﬁcw a g e s .
38demographic factors ﬁxed at their pre-1984 values, allowing only the shock volatil-
ity to fall. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 5.1. Had demographics
stayed constant across periods, aggregate volatility would have fallen by only 55
log points. Hence, demographic change accounts for approximately 10% of the
moderation in output, and 15% of the moderation in aggregate hours.29
Note that the benchmark model does not capture the increase in the relative
volatility of young workers’ hours since 1984.30 As a result, the benchmark coun-
terfactual likely understates the role of demographic change. Not only did the
post-moderation period see a fall in the share of young, volatile workers, but also
those workers became more volatile. In this case, holding shares constant at pre-
moderation values would entail larger demographic eﬀects.31 Because the model
cannot account for this, we propose two simple, reduced-form modiﬁcations to
gauge its quantitative importance.
The ﬁrst modiﬁcation involves varying the labor supply elasticities across pe-
riods. Speciﬁcally, we set the pre-moderation values of θY and θO to match the
relative volatilities of young and old hours to output in 1968 - 1984; we set the
post-moderation values of θY and θO to match the relative volatilities in 1985 -
2004. This modiﬁcation alone does not allow us to match std(HY)/std(Y )=1 .79
in the post-moderation period. This is not surprising since the benchmark calibra-
tion (which set θY =0 ) considerably underpredicts this statistic. Given this, we
29W ea l s op e r f o r m e dt h ec o u n t e r f a c t u a li nw h i c ht h ep o s t - 1 9 8 5p e r i o di sr e - s i m u l a t e dw i t ht h e
shock process of the pre-1984 period, allowing only demographics to change. In this experiment,
demographic change accounts for virtually the same fraction of the moderation in hours and
output as discussed above.
30Recall that in Section 4, we found no evidence for an eﬀect of age composition on age-speciﬁc
employment volatility in the G7. Hence, an open question is whether the increase in the relative
volatility of young hours in the U.S. is related to demographic change, or is due to some other
factor. In on-going work, we investigate the potential relationship between the age structure
and age-group volatility in the U.S., exploiting state level variation in demographic change.
31The same is true for old workers, as their hours became slightly more stable (see Panel A,
Table 5.1); quantitatively, this eﬀect is likely much weaker.
39also modify the speciﬁcation of preferences. Speciﬁcally, we assume that family
members have momentary utility functions of the form considered in Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988):




i /(1 + θi)
¤
,i = {Y,O}.
As is well known, this speciﬁcation induces greater hours volatility due to the lack
of income eﬀects on labor supply.
We ﬁrst repeat the counterfactual with equalized labor supply elasticities
(θY = θO), and ﬁnd that demographic change accounts for essentially the same
share of the moderation in volatility as in the benchmark experiment with Rogerson-
Hansen preferences. We take this as evidence that the change in preference spec-
iﬁcation per se does not aﬀect the counterfactual results. We then consider the
case in which we match std(HY)/std(Y ) and std(HO)/std(Y ) in both periods.
Performing the same counterfactual as described above, we ﬁnd that demographic
change now accounts for 15% of the moderation in output volatility, and 25% of
the moderation in aggregate hours volatility, in the modiﬁed model.
In summary, this simple variant of the RBC model with capital-experience
complementarity attributes a similar role to demographic change in the modera-
tion of macroeconomic volatility to what is predicted in our experiments in Section
4. Hence, a structural model that is capable of replicating the observed changes in
the relative volatility of hours worked by young and old agents would potentially
attribute a similar role to demographics. Finally, note that the current model has
only two groups of workers. Thus, our counterfactuals ignore important compo-
sition changes within the 15 - 29 and 30+ year old age groups. Speciﬁcally, the
counterfactuals understate the fall in the share of 15 - 19 year olds, and the increase
in the share of 40 - 49 year olds observed in the post-moderation period. Because
these are the most volatile and most stable age groups, respectively, a more dis-
aggregated treatment of the age composition would suggest an even greater role
40for demographics. In JPS, we show how a richer environment with more than two
demographic groups conﬁr m st h i sc o n j e c t u r e . 32
6. Conclusion
Recently, a number of papers have documented the empirical implications of de-
mographic change for macroeconomic analysis.33 In this paper, we investigate
the consequences of demographic change for business cycle analysis. We ﬁnd that
changes in the age composition of the labor force account for a signiﬁcant fraction
of the variation in postwar business cycle volatility in G7 economies.
Our identiﬁcation comes from the variation in the extent and timing of de-
mographic change experienced across countries during the postwar period. Using
panel data methods, we show that the age composition of the workforce has a
quantitatively large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on cyclical volatility. More-
over, the estimated eﬀect is found to be U-shaped as a function of age. We
supplement this by documenting a U-shaped pattern in the cyclical volatility of
employment and hours worked across age groups in the same sample of countries.
Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate that the crucial channel of inﬂuence of
demographic composition on business cycle volatility operates through diﬀerences
in the sensitivity of market work across age groups.
We articulate this idea within the context of a quantitative macroeconomic
model featuring capital-experience complementarity in production. We show that
the model generates signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the volatility of hours worked across
age groups, and we demonstrate that variation in the age composition of aggregate
32Including more age groups implies that elasticity parameters can no longer be estimated
with linear, least-squares methods. Such issues make inclusion of the richer model beyond the
scope of this paper.
33See, for instance, Shimer (1998) and Abraham and Shimer (2002) who study the impact of
the aging of the baby boom population on U.S. unemployment.
41hours accounts for a signiﬁcant fraction of the moderation in U.S. business cycle
volatility. These results corroborate estimates of the role of demographics in the
Great Moderation that are derived from simple quantitative accounting exercises
performed on U.S. data. In summary, we ﬁnd that demographic composition
constitutes an important propagation mechanism in business cycle analysis.
A. Data Sources
U.S. Hours worked: 1963 - 2005, March CPS, Bureau of Labor Statistics and
U.S. Census Bureau. Employment, labor force, and population: 1963 - 2004,
OECD Labour Force Statistics database (hereafter OECD LFS). Birth rates: 1900
- 1989, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970,a n d
Mini Historical Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau. Real GDP: 1958 - 2004, FRED
database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Japan. Hours worked: 1972 - 2004, Annual Report of the Labour Force Survey
(hereafter ARLFS), Statistics Bureau of Japan. Employment: 1967 - 1971, OECD
LFS; 1972 - 2004, ARLFS. Labor force and population: 1963 - 1971, OECD LFS;
1972 - 2004, ARLFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, Historical Statistics of Japan,
Statistics Bureau of Japan. Real GDP: 1958 - 2004, Economic and Social Research
Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce, Government of Japan.
Canada: Employment: 1976 - 2004, OECD LFS. Labor force and population:
1966 - 1975, special tabulation of Labour Force Survey provided by Statistics
Canada; 1976 - 2004, OECD LFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, B.R. Mitchell (2003),
International Historical Statistics: the Americas, 1750-2000, New York : Palgrave
Macmillan. Real GDP: 1961 - 2004, CANSIM database.
France: Employment: 1968 - 2004, OECD LFS. Labor force and population: 1965
42- 2004, OECD LFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, B.R. Mitchell (2003), International
Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, New York : Palgrave Macmillan (here-
after MITCHELL E). Real GDP: 1960 - 2002, Stock and Watson (2003), which
has been modiﬁed to account for 1968 strikes.
Germany: Employment, labor force and population: 1970 - 2004, OECD LFS.
Birth rates: 1900 - 1955, MITCHELL E; 1956 - 1989, Federal Statistics Oﬃce,
Germany. Real GDP: 1965 - 2002, Stock and Watson (2003), which has been
modiﬁed to account for 1991 reuniﬁcation.
Italy: Employment and labor force: 1983 - 2004, Eurostat database and OECD
LFS. Population: 1983 - 2004, World Population Prospects, United Nations. Birth
rates: 1900 - 1989, MITCHELL E. Real GDP: 1978 - 2004, Stock and Watson
(2003), and Eurostat database.
UK: Employment: 1983, special tabulation of Labour Force Survey provided by
Oﬃce for National Statistics, UK; 1984 - 2004, OECD LFS. Labor force and
population: 1979 - 1983, special tabulation of Labour Force Survey provided by
Oﬃce for National Statistics, UK; 1984 - 2004, OECD LFS. Birth rates: 1900 -
1989, MITCHELL E. Real GDP: 1974 - 2004, Oﬃce for National Statistics, UK.
For all countries, inﬂation rates constructed from GDP deﬂator data obtained
from the Datastream database, Thomson Financial.
B. Additional Tables
B.1. Alternative Filtering
Here we present the tables of Section 2, except HP ﬁltering with smoothing para-
meter 100. The ﬁrst table is analogous to Table 2.1 for the U.S.
4315-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65+
raw
volatility 6.858 3.283 2.510 1.729 1.391 1.399 2.248 4.324
R2 0.77 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.70 0.44 0.40
cyclical
volatility 5.995 2.874 2.231 1.617 1.317 1.150 1.336 2.695
%o fh o u r s 3.24 10.33 12.86 25.38 23.29 17.20 4.82 2.88
%o fh o u r s
volatility 10.58 16.18 15.63 22.37 16.71 10.78 3.51 4.23
The next table is analogous to Table 2.2 for Japan.
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65+
raw
volatility
4.270 1.469 1.222 1.123 0.977 0.830 1.516 1.986
R2 0.74 0.68 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.88 0.57 0.39
cyclical
volatility 3.475 1.115 1.055 0.970 0.850 0.782 1.156 1.161
%o fh o u r s 2.21 10.18 11.77 23.34 24.19 18.67 4.92 4.73
%o fh o u r s
volatility 7.65 11.30 12.37 22.55 20.47 14.53 5.66 5.47
B.2. Alternative Demographic Splits
Here we presents results on the volatility of hours worked in the U.S. by age
and education. Because of the relatively small fraction of 15 - 19 year olds with
postsecondary education, we omit them in the analysis; because of relatively small
sample sizes, we combine the 60 - 64 and 65+ age groups.
15+ 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
raw vol.
HS and less 1.607 2.636 2.181 1.761 1.215 1.291 2.001
more than HS 0.849 2.459 1.422 0.755 0.824 0.861 1.949
cyclical vol.
HS and less 1.569 2.374 1.967 1.657 1.071 1.004 1.169
more than HS 0.794 1.888 1.177 0.590 0.595 0.364 0.750
The next table presents the volatility of hours worked in the U.S. by age and
44gender. Again, because of small sample sizes, we combine the 60 - 64 and 65+
age groups.
15+ 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
raw vol.
female 1.240 5.384 2.279 1.789 1.282 1.091 1.110 2.299
male 1.331 5.117 3.057 1.860 1.394 0.953 0.980 1.774
cyclical vol.
female 1.220 4.628 1.965 1.352 1.003 0.916 0.794 0.969
male 1.310 4.270 2.480 1.673 1.286 0.863 0.778 0.990
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Figure 1. Average Response of Unemployment to Postwar US Recession. Solid line: average response; dashed 




















































































































Figure 4. Demographics and Business Cycle Volatility, US. Light, square-hatched line: standard deviation of output 
































































Figure 5. Demographics and Business Cycle Volatility, Japan. Light, square-hatched line: standard deviation of 




























































































































































Figure 6. Demographics and Business Cycle Volatility, G7 Economies, Part 1. Light, square-hatched line: business 




























































































































































Figure 7. Demographics and Business Cycle Volatility, G7 Economies, Part 2. Light, square-hatched line: business 
cycle output volatility; dark, diamond-hatched line: ‘volatile aged’ labor force share. 
 